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INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about ideas and its consequences. After 
the Second World War, post祠colonial r皂白 Imes In 
Southeast Asia began exploring new ways and methods 
of improving the livelihoods of its people as well as 
、catching up' with th 巴 modern economi巴s in the west. 
This context also allowed different ideas to coalesce 0口
notions of nation, nationhood and statehood. ln my 
paper, 1 will attempt to understand the life of ideas as 
they pulsate through one of the largest nations within 
Southeast Asia: lndon巴si白. With a population of mo悶制甸、
than 200 million peopl 巴， it is one of th巴|且rgest MusliÍ1加棚d
democracies in the world. Indonesia's h也tory howeve{, {'也可
like its tradition日 1 shadow puppet plays, is one of botn叫 j
triumph and tragedy. Before achi巴ving its present lev，.el，，"叫
of democracy, Indonesia was ruled by former president，..，恥
Suha忱。 whose political car巴巴r began with one of ti;1'~"-恥叫
largest purges of political dissidents within the regio![iJ,.,II,^",,1 
When Suha忱。 finally st巴pped down aft巴r a 32-y<;ar." 
long rule in 1998, Indonesia was left with an abysrT)此心叫
hu付lan rights record of assassinations, force世
disappearances and the suppression of dissent. WIir'r心帆
then did it take more than three decades rtrr 
Indonesians to overthrow Suha比口's kleptocracy? Why 
did so many Indon巴sians remain compliant in the face 
of widespread human rights violations? This paper will 
th巴 n also enter a discussion on how a chan日In g
Indonesia is b巴ginning to deal with the past legacies of 
Suha仕o's rule and the 、白 rganic' nature of th巴 New
Ord巴 r Regime 
While the Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 
Ind口nesia (or the Armed forc巴s of the Republic of 
lndonesia) was an impo比ant el 巴ment in maintaining 
1 
the regime's 、 cohesion'， it was but only on巴 of many 
coercive instruments available to Suha比口 's New Order 
government. At th 巴 core， lay a web of ideas which gave 
ideological shape and structure to Suharto's Indonesia 
Therefore, 1 will investigate both the character and 
evocative power of these ideas as theγare transmitted 
to th巴 peopl巴 of Indonesi 日. My paper will state that 
these id巴as in themselv巴s gav巴 Indonesians a cl 巴且「
vision of a united lndonesia as it rose from the ashes of 
centuries-Iong col 口 nialism bγth巴 Dutch. These ideas 
appealed to deeply held cultural-historical values, 
which at the same time also allowed Indones日 to lay 
claim to its past as a region wide maritime empire. 1 
posit that by app巴aling to its grand past, Indonesia 
could then rise above the stigma of being a former 
colony. In order to do this however, the people of 
Indonesia had to be 'incorporated' i 鬥to the 、body' of 
Indonesia given th巴 plural nature and character of this 
archipelagic nation. Regardless of ethnic backgrounds 
or religious belief, all Indonesians had to become an 
、口 rganic' pa內 of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. It is 
precls巴Iy this 、 org日 nic' nature of the N巴w Order r巴glme
which allow巴d di仟'erent ethnic groups to be absorbed 
into it while those deemed inimical could be 
、 neutralised'. 1 will utilis巴 political theorist Hannah 
Arendt's concept of the 、 social' in order to understand 
how the Indon巴sian nation間state used cultural concepts 
to blur the Ii n 巴s between the individual, the state and 
the practice of democratic politics. 
While this studγis exclusivelγof Indon巴sia ， 1 
believe that similar studies can also be conducted 0口
「皂白 imes throughout the Asian r皂白ion as many states 
continue to utilise th皂、 or自由 nicist' model at the expe口se
of democracy and human rights. While the Asian values 
z 
discours巴 may no long巴r hold water, 50utheast Asian 
regimes, I believe, will continue to evoke cultural 
values to justify limits on democratic participation and 
human rights. More impo比antly ， this paper reflects my 
own concerns as to whγgroups and individuals tend to 
place so much more faith in the institutions of state 
rather than in what political theorist Martha Nussbaum 
would call , their own 、 capabilities'. Lastly, it is my belief 
that the closer the interconn巴ctedness with the state, 
ther巴 is gr巴拉巴r the oppo代unity for 且 rbitra 門， state 
behaviour and human rights violations. Thus, 
50utheast Asia's d巴velopm巴ntalist state model has 
creat巴d an environment where 、 politics' is not s巴巴n aS;~i州州111• ，
ar巴na open for contestation and debate but rath巴 r as a'川圳il'$þ"
spac巴 meant exclusively for the those with th巴叫ght Jd糊h
kind of 、 knowledge'. Ít was precisely the lack - Of""""il''''''" 
democratic space which gave rise to violent."，.科W
confrontations betw巴巴n citiz巴ns and the arm巴d forc巴5 … 
in the lead up to Suha巾，sdownfall ln199Bf 「
Indonesians le忱。ut of the development process saw nci_""，，"叫
other avenue than to violently oppose the New Orde".'μ 
regime which had effectively closed 0仟 all avenues td卅心叫
dissent, discussion and debate. It is my hope that i 門f
arguing for an open d 巴mocratic space, t昀ha前t 50叫ut吋h巴臼as~恥ωω叫圳a枷趴枷
As剖ian natio叩ns may gr悶av叫it切ate t切口war吋ds gr陀巴at巴r
democratic debate consolidation rather than violence 
and destruction. 
BEFORE THE END AND IN THE BEGINNING 
Following th巴 Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the 
emerging economies within Southeast As ia began to 
crumble as the Thai baht began to slide. Many foreign 
investors, economists and intell 巴ctuals had before the 
crisis, bravely announced that the 、tig er econ om ies' of 
3 
50uth巴ast Asia were marching in巴xorablγinto a new 
era. The years of economic boom beginnin日 in the earlγ 
1990s had imbued many 50utheast Asian nations with 
pride in their 、Asianess'， distinct from the free月
wheelin日， liberal and individualistic West. Despite the 
paltry human rights records of many of these countries, 
their emerging economic power was proof that 
economics had trump巴d civil Ii berti巴s. However wh巴n
the Asia鬥 financial crisis erupt巴d ， the so-called 、Asia鬥
values' prov巴d to be ineffectiv巴 against the relentless 
onslaught of currency speculators from without and the 
endemic corruption from within. Nearly all of the 
50uth巴ast Asian tig 巴 r economies were affected but the 
political repercussions were especially drastic in 
Indonesia. Its currency, the rupiah, lost nearly half of 
its value signalling an overnight rise in the price of 
basic commodities. Students began demanding 
accountability, calling for an end to KKN (Korupsi, 
Kolusi,. Nepotisme) or corruption, cronyism and 
nepotism. The shape of Indonesia also b巴gan to change 
wh巴n BJ Habibie, whom replaced Suha比口， 自 Ilowed a 
referendum where the East Timor巴se overwhelmingly 
voted for independence from Indonesia. Th巴 spe巴d of 
th巴巴V巴nts in Indonesia threw many observ白的。仟
guard but this was also a testam巴nt to the fragilitγof 
Indonesia's unity. 
With boundaries encompassing thousands of 
islands and home to a multitude of ethnic groups, 
Indon巴sia appears haphazardly cobbled togeth巴r.
Achieving independence in 1949, Indon巴sia's
sover巴ignty was constantly und巴 r attack, initiallγbγthe 
returning Dutch after World War 2 and int巴rnally by 
groups op口。sed to the central government located in 
Jakarta. During its founding years, Indon巴sla se川ed as 
4 
a chaotic ideological battl 巴日 round with Ma以ism ， social 
democracy, nationaJism and even Islam cont巴nding for 
the soul of the nation. It was however the abortive 
coup bγa cabal of gen巴rals in 1965 that signalled the 
beginnings of a unified New Order.' Th巴 newly minted 
president Suha巾。 sought to differentiat巴 hims巴 If from 
form巴 r pr巴sid巴nt Sukarno's old order wh巴re po litica 1 
pa仕ies ，、'...had only succeed巴d in dividing Indonesians 
along religious' and ideological lines, threatening 
national unity and leading ultimately to political and 
economic ruin" (Bourchier & Hadiz 2003: 11) 
州~nh.\t，UI~I ，1;心
Not only did Suharto force Sukarno to Sbeji)"" 
down, the New Order regime bega口 on the bodie耳 åf"九
nearly half to a million souls, 5日 crificed in a baptis卅古以
pogrom. Many were m巴mb巴rs of le仗-lea r;1i;J;l.~糊
口 rganisations and the banned Communist Party .Jl,[ 
Indon巴sia with th 巴 lar日巴st memb巴「shlp outside ofATfE1 
Soviet Union and China. Others consisted of et);",",i'ß,",'il 
minorities and elements deemed dangerous to i,th,e 
state. With his ideological opponents 巴佇巴cti~，eh>!~~
destroyed, Suharto began consolidating both his pqwer 
as well as the state's. To this end, Suharto and}"'rl'is叫
ideol 口gues began 行ne-tuning a form of p口 litical
。 rganisation which had already been in existence when 
the Indonesian republic was founded in the mid 1940's. 
1 The New Order sought to 、ove仕urn' Sukarno's old order which was 
perceived to be f問 ctious， weakened by over po!iticking and inclined 
towards Communism. Sukarn。這 many misadventures including the 
fa i!ed 'Crush Ma[aysia Campaign' during the Indonesia-Malaysia 
Confrontation from 1962-1965 al50 prompted more conservative 
generals such 85 Suharto to 、step in', However it is not within the 
scope of this paper to anaJyse that period of Indonesian histo門. For 
more detailed discussion, please refer to Frank1in B. Weinstein's 
Indonesia Abandons Con月伊onta訂on ﹒ An Inquiry into the Functions of 
Indonesian Foreign Policy (1969) 
5 
Referred to as organicism, its 弋 recurring conc巴pts are 
order, harmony and hierarchy." More impo內antlγr
"...Suha內o and many of his clos巴st political allies 
promot巴d 的巴 idea that authority within the Indonesia鬥
state should reflect the patterns found withi口 traditional
famili巴s and orderlγvillage societies" (Bourchier & 
Hadiz 2日03: 8) 國 This New Order emphasis on villag 巴
、 culture'， inspired by the traditional villag 巴 structures in 
Java, served to depoliticis巴 the general Indonesian 
populace whilst also promoting the so-called village 
values of consultation and consensus. Muafakat and 
musyawarah ensured that there would be no active 
dissent within the populace. By using the Javanese 
village as a model , th巴 New Order leaders wer巴 well
aware that rural envi的nm巴nts had in place strict 
hierarchical structures, led by villag 巴 heads. Suharto, 
bγdefault became Indonesia's chief village head 
presiding over the lives of millions. Nonetheless the use 
of these cultural markers as pot巴nt political sγmbols 
reflected an Indonesian reality wh巴re its populace still 
lived in rural 巴nvironments.
Suharto's choice of 昌、 regime of truth' is also 
influenced by its past coloni白 1 history 咽 According to 
jVJ ichel Foucault, such 、 regimes of truth' are formulated 
by the state to cr皂白te "...a circular relation with 
systems of power that produce and sustain it, and to 
effects of power which it induces and which extends 
it..." (Foucault in Gordon 1 日 80: 133). The political 
symbolism behind the uses of concepts such as village 
valu巴s is also intert叫In巴d in a 、circular' fashion with the 
state's reliance on traditional or adat law i 鬥 the
formulation of Indonesia's constitution. The organicist 
principl 巴 's inception into Indonesian political life began 
whe鬥 Dutch administrators began uti'li sing local 
6 
conceptions of law and ord巴 r to administer the lives of 
their colonial 、children'. The immediate e仟'ect though 
was th巴、 reification' of the natives, repr巴sented as 
beings incapable of achieving agency and modernity. 
This 、 regime of truth' was diss巴minated through local 
Indonesian elites who received their 巴ducation in 
Holland. One such local scholar was R. Supomo who 
later becam巴 one of the principal architects of the 
Indon巴sian Constitution. Disillusioned with their own 
societies, Dutch prof巴ssors ensured that students such 
as Supomo would r巴turn to Indonesia spr巴ading th巴
belief that all p巴oples have a "".a Volkgeist (national 
spirit) , and that it is on the basis of this living brea)lh惘。h
essenc巴- rather than on abstract universal prinöpLese' 
such as popular sovereignty or democracy - that n'i2 tiBl'f", 
stat巴s should be built" (Bourchier 2007: 1Ï'!ii'Ìè" 
Japan巴se colonial administrators during the World妙叫他1
2 fu比her bolstered organicist thinking amOn.f1，~t 
Indonesian elites, stressing that, "...nations w巴re Ilt1ì吋
beings" (Bourchier 2007: 116). Suha內口's new Q!ëQI研J
regime inherited this legacy, r巴ifying indigenous v'ia'I l.iβS 
on one hand but ultimately conflating it with the 裝且跑到A
The creative implementation of the 、family' and 、 vil旭日e'
state ensur巴d that Indonesian citizens r巴m午FI;em叫
compliant and yet at th巴 sam巴 time melded intó- th巴
body politic of the Indonesian stat巴. They w巴re then to 
be regarded and shaped as th皂、f1 0ating masses' 
According to Suharto's chief ideological 
craftsman, Major General Ali Moe內opo， the 可loating
masses' (massa mengambang) refers to a 1 且可巴
majority of Indonesians who we陀、played' upon by 
political parties and ideologies. As such, "".the people, 
especially those in the villages always fell prey to the 
political pa內ies and ideological interests of those 
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parties" (Moertopo 1972: 8日). Easily swaγed bγ 
巴xternal influences, Moe內opo believed that these 
、simple folk' would then igno陀、'".the nec巴ssities of 
daily life, the need for d巴velopm巴nt and improvement 
of their own lives, materially as well as spirituallγ" 
(Moe仕opo 1972: 85). According to him, th 巴se 'floating 
masses' should instead turn t口、functional groups' or 
(Golongan Karya or Golkar) in order to fulfil their 
political n巴巴ds. Comprised of non-political 巴lements ，
Golkar was essentially a conglomeration of t巴chnocrats ，
civil se凹ants and groups associat巴d with the 
government. The most important grouping though 
within the G口Ikar is the army. During th巴 New Order 
era, the armed forces w巴re giv巴 n a special role as the 
protectors of both Indonesia's sovereignty as w巴11 as its 
internal unitγ. It had a dual function or dwi-fungsi of 
providing external defence as well as guiding and 
accelerating the development process. However, 
throughout the New Order period, they were the 
greatest single perpetrator of human rights violations 
und巴rmining both the state as well as Suha內口's
presidency. From the beginning of the New Order 
regime till 1998, the armed forces were actively 
suppressing political dissidents, involv巴d in 巴xtra
jl.Jdicial killings as well as perpetrating atrocities in th巴
outer island provinces of Aceh, Papua as well as the 巴x­
province of East Timor. While the armed forces have 
be巴n 、「巴fo鬥lled'， they continue to play an important 
role in the political life of Indonesia. 
THEORISING THE ORGANIC STATE 
For' Indonesia, East Timor's independenc巴 was a 
t巴rrible loss. Wh巴n the results of th巴「巴ferendum wer巴
巴nnounced in Sept巴mber 1999, the Indonesian military 
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arm巴d [oca[ mi[itias a[[owing them to burn , [oot, 
rampage and kill before the arriva[ of int巴rnationa[
peacek巴巴pers. The Indonesian. army, as described by 
Joseph Nevins, wanted to raze 巴verything to th皂
白 round [eaving nothing but rocks (Nevins 2005). Why 
was the army so re[uctant to [et go of East Timor even 
wh巴n it was c[ear that Indonesia stood to [ose more ín 
maintaining East Tímor as a provínce? Why was the 
Indonesian government so wi[ling to undergo 
internatfona[ condemnatíon and pressure ín order t口
maintaín contro[ over ha[f an ís[and with a popu[ation of 
[ess than one mi[[ion? As former foreign minister Ai'i州M 叫 l
Alatas surmíses, the Indonesían state rea[ised that Ea訕咱TT
Timor wou[d becom巴 a 、P巴bb[e in the shoe', a prob[ei;p 
~;;i~h ';;;~[d ~~t-go away (A[atas 2006). '"郎以
，t)..v. t: ，:rI， I OI'A州叫
According to Indon闊的 scho[ar Samue[ Mo口市州峙
(2001) , his discovery of a cache of documents on t~惶 h
eve of the army's depa比ure revea[ed that despi峙的眉目圳、
cost of the war in East Timor, military [ead巴 rs ínsís時d..j"
on maintaining the conflíct. Indonesia's armed forceþi制沁叫
Moor巴 states ， ignored warning signs, insístíng that t可e
war could b巴 won. These messages were then r巴[ay副d~，~:"，:n州
back to the government in Jakarta, who were [u[led ínto 
a s巴nse of fa[se security. The centra[ governπlent 
"...viewed the East Timorese as it díd Indonesians, a 
'f[oatíng mass', a mind[ess pub[ic that wou[d be easí[y 
swayed and manipu[at巴d ， and cou[d therefore not be 
trusted with democracy" (Moore 2001: 11). C[ouded by 
íts very own state ídeo[ogy, the In 丘。n巴sían state cou[d 
not reconci[e the fact that the East Timorese w巴re ab[e 
to sustain theír resistance through steely r巴so[v巴 and
ingenuity. Moor巴 states that 、'...de[uded by its own 
mγths ， the Indon巴sian military nev巴r fully understood 
the nature of its enemγ- and this u[timate[γ 
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contributed to its own undoíng" (Moore 2001: 12) 
What was the compe[[ing nature of these myths which 
made the Indonesian government willing to igno挖出巴
costs of a long-drawn and unpopu[ar war? Whγdid 
both the New Order regime and the mi[itary not 
concede that they were not ab[e to win the war? 
The fates of East Timor and Indonesia b巴cam巴
巴nmeshed intertwined when the former's ties with 
Portuga[ became undone. Negl巴ct巴d by the PO比ugu巴se
for severa[ hundred years, the oppo比U口 ity for 
indep巴ndenc巴 came when the Estado N口vo r巴gim巴 was
topp[ed durin日 the Carnation Revo[ution. As the 
ensuing politica[ unrest threatened to esca[ate in East 
Timor, secret discussions took p[ace betw巴en Suha巾。r
then US. president Gera[d Ford and Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger. A院巴r receiving imp[icit .approva[ from 
th巴 US ， Suha比o then sent in troops to occupy East 
Timor, ending its hop巴5 for forma[ ind巴pendenc巴. East 
Timor was imp口比ant strategica[[y to Indonesia because 
it bord巴red Australía and th 巴 body of water in b巴tw巴巴n
was known to have vast res巴川es of fossi[ fu巴| 丁hus
Indonesia's colonia[ exercis巴 in East Timor was a[so 
prompted by profit. On the other hand , th巴 Indonesian
government required an ideologica[ reasoning for its 
foraγ into East Timor. In a speech giv巴口 to East 
Tímorese offícia[s just before its íntegration into 
Indonesia, Suha巾。 deemed th巴 officia[s his "...broth巴rs
who were separated for a [ong time" (Suharto in 
Krieger 1997: 47). According to him, co[onialism had 
separated the East Timores巴 from their archipelagic 
heritage which now [ies within Indonesia. Suharto adds 
that, 
1日
...a[[ of this was m巴「巴 [y the resu[t of 
for巴ign co[onia[ po[itics and interests. 
Without dividing us, th巴Y wou[d not be 
ab[e to dominate this vast and dense[y 
populated archipelago. This archipelago 
was once united, with an area 
approximately the size of the present 
territory of the unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia. History noted the 
famous Sriwijaha Kingdom, as w巴11 as 
the well-known Majapahit Kingdom 
(Suharto in Krieger 1997: 47) 
，但后品晶1;::，<(<丸
Indones旬 's pr巴-colonial history has provided tFl,e .. ,,#"' 
state with a pow巴斤ul lmaglnary ln whlch tDbolsterv!tEiWHl 
organicist approach to b口的 int巴rnal and extern治拼命f
affairs. The Sriwijaha and Majapahit empir巴5 W旬開削叫
archipelagic empires which ex址ed betwe巴n thE71 
C巴ntury and 14th century. Their influence encompas弱忍耐叫
nearly all of maritime South巴ast As吭 W卅做恥叫
civilisation centred on the islands of Sumatra and la固C，
Java. Therefore the Sriwijaha and Majapahit empij&司~..m.:&1!
served as blueprints for a newlγminted Indonesia st?te 
to reclaim 旭、former' glory. The archipelag口 '5 p!問川
colonial past justifies the unity and existence of the 
Indonesian state whilst at the same time placing the 
blame for its colonial period on the divisiv巴 nature of 
western imp巴rialism. Indonesia's colonial adv巴ntures ，
from East Timor to Irian can then be justified as an 
att巴mpt to make whole again empir巴s of the past in the 
present. This is perhaps one of the most comp巴lling
id巴ological r巴asons why Indonesia found it esp巴cially
traumatic t。可et go' of East Timor. This 、trauma' on the 
pa比 of Indonesia also partiallγexp lains the scorched 
earth policy following East Timor's referendum on its 
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indep巴nd巴nce. Therefor巴 its resolve has hardened ov巴「
the ret巴 ntion of another r巴stive province, Irian, despite 
an on-going armed resistanc巴. Any further 司注empt to 
secede bγany oth巴 r provlnc巴 in Indonesia is likely to 
seen by the Indon巴sian state as a threat to its very 
ideological unity. 
Indonesia, its neighbours within the r皂白ion and 
even China are examples of countries where th巴 past is 
not a 、forei9n' country. Students and intellectuals of the 
May Fourth movem巴nt in China during the 1920's 
based its ardent sense of nationalism on the perception 
that it had been 、 bullied' and 、 disgraced' for n皂白 rly a 
hundred yea悶 (Mitter 2004). Other countries within 
Southeast Asia are also quick to subscribe to the view 
that colonialism was a stain on their national being. 
Many 口f the national narrativ巴s within these nations 
would state that had it not been for th巴 deleterious
forces of c白 lonialism ， th巴s巴 countries would have 
achieved gr巴atness in their long march towards 
mod巴rnity. Non巴theless ， colonialism '5 stain on th巴
national narrative serves also to di仟er巴ntiate thes巴
countries in th巴巴巴st from their former colonial mast巴的
in the west. In the early 1990's Malaysian and 
Singaporean premiers Mahathir Mohamad and Lee 
Kuan Yew stat巴d that the w巴st was in stat巴 of decline 
due to their heavy emphasis on individuality, free 
speech and liberal-democratic values. It was because 
countries in Southeast Asia look巴d towards 、 Eastern' or 
、Asian' valu巴5 that they were ab[e to flourish. Lee 
appealed to id巴as of 'Confucianism' while Mahathir 
preferred to 、look east'. Indon巴sia however, did not 
offcially adopt th巴、Asian Valu巴s' discours巴 but what it 
did instead was to use local conceptions and values, 
similar to th皂、collectivist'，、patriarchal' belief syst巴m
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espoused by its neighbou悶. For the Indonesian state 
there was no need to look outside of its bord巴rs as it 
had its own 、civilisation'. At the very core of Indones日 's
、 civilisational valu.es' was the village. In a way it can 
also be argued that the state had to 巴xist in order to 
protect the 、 purer' village from the corrupting 
influences of liberal democracy, thus the need for a 
policy on both 、 floating masses' and 、 functional' groups. 
FRAMING IT WITHIN THE SOCIAL 
While conducting research , 1 was t巴mpted to pla平直耐î~'"川f
within Hannah Arendt's theory of the 、 social' (Ar的di:"'"
1958). Elucidated within her seminal work, The Hu啊仇
Condition, the 、 social' is simply put, a grey ai'~a"" 
betw巴en two oth巴r categories she refers to as ，\""'Iole叫
、public' and th皂、private' realm. Arendt states that ttLe" 
、 public' is a r巴alm where individuals interact with Æiî巴川
another as equals discussing, and pr悶曰 cti廿tis仿剖tn日 po叫li叫t
a democrati比c， cor\ tentious but open space. On the o，th早「
hand is th巴 privat巴 where th巴 master of the h~凶s.e~1:!1
returns to in ord巴 r to deal exclusively with "...surv;ival , 
the needs of the body, and bi日 logical n巴cessity i叫f'ëh但叫
household ... was private. When in modern times-, it 
W巴nt public, it became the social" (Pitkin 1998: 11). 
Therefore, when private matters leaked into the public 
sphe悶， housek巴巴ping takes on national prop口比lons tn 
the form of the economy, public healthca舟， trade, 
division of labour et cetera. Arendt then contends that 
the danger lies in the expanding role of the 
government due to th巴 correlating expansion within the 
private realm. The public, which is wher巴 democracy
「巴mains the most alive, is foreshadowed by the 
Leviathan-like stat巴. Borders between the privat巴 and
public become blurred leaving only the state to manage 
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the matt巴 rs of th 巴 expanded national 、family'. This sets 
a dang巴rous prec巴dent as the stat巴s subsumes 
everything in the name of the 、familyγwell-being ，
destroying the democratic 、 public' realm. This, 
according to scholars of Arendt, was what gave ris巴 to
totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany, fascist Italy 
and the Soviet Union. Suhart口 's N巴w Ord巴r regim巴 was
certainly no totalitarian regime (there were ma鬥Y
instanc巴s wh巴re its citiz巴ns vociferously resisted the 
'family' state) but Arendt's concept makes 
understanding Indonesia much easier. There was little 
、 public' space and the state had taken over the affairs 
of the family. As the head of the family and village, it 
would not allow the needed public space to exist since 
the 、floating masses' wer巴 so innoc巴nt， gullible and 
pliant. Therefore through 'functional groups' which 
provided the dir巴ction and the army which provided the 
needed 、 push energy', Indonesia would be abl巴 to
return i隘的rmer glo巾， inheriting the grandeur of both 
the Sriwijaha and Majapahit empir巴5 咽 Nonetheless
Arendt's concept can only go so far in explaining 
Indonesia's organic natu悶If we were to take 
Indonesia state as a 、 body' or a 、 bein日， in its own, we 
can also 'see that like anγoth巴 r organism it is prone to 
moments of 、 lapse'. Within these mom巴nts the口 I
believ巴 is when th皂、public' actually r皂白 ppears leaving 
behind conundrums and paradoxes. 
INTERSTICES AND LAPSES 
One of the most contentious events within Indonesian 
national history is without doubt the massacres 
fOllowing the abortive 5巴ptember 30th COUp in 1日65.
ManγIndonesians born post-1965 ar色的miliar with a 
state produced film shown every year depicting how 
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th巴 Communists had plo往巴d to undermine th巴
Indonesian government and its leaders. While the film 
is no longer shown following Suha忱。's downfall , 
Indon巴sians continu巴 to ponder on the event. Th巴
Indonesian 、 body' seems to be Iiving in a state of 
confused amn巴Sla p巴rtaining not just to this particular 
event but also on many others. The enforc巴d
、forgetting' in the Indon巴sian body has b巴巴n so 
pronounced that man'y' are still unaware of the 
dynamics of the event except what is told in 0仟icial
history. However, there is a growing realisation from 
local Indonesian scholars for a need to inv巴stigate and 
question official accounts of the past. In a coll 巴cti 0 n;l~rd'F"!I ，'I'li\.， 
essays written by oral historians on the events of tha晶。.，;'
period, an article written by stud巴nt Rinto Tri HasvJo仁d圳、
stands out. In it he describes how 、'...he had ne~"i:iÞ，，;/ 
qu巴stioned the version of history given to hú:;aμ翎
(Hasworo 2004: 25). He blames media manipulation q,J;',", 
the governm巴nt as one of the reasons for this amne到84T
He also questions the way in which history is writ悅耳仰的
by pondering on whγa coup which a仟'ect巴 d Glnly 
several elites could have caused deaths 個日他Ðil'<!
disappearances of so many. What vested interest:r of 
the few could have 自仟'ected the Iives of so many? .1""'你們叫
Amnesia 口 r enforced forgetting in any 、organic'
state will inevitably produce a 、lapse' in th巴 na rrative of 
th巴 nation. While the state's power ov巴 r the 、social'
may stop a 、 public' discussion of the issue, it does not 
mean that these v巴ry lapses 巴xist in the minds of 
individual citiz巴 ns. Th巴 largest fiaw in the id 巴ology of 
th巴 New Ord巴 r was in its 日ssumption that th巴、floating
mass巴s' could easilγbe duped or would unquestioningly 
follow the sta峙's logic. While being pa肉。f the 、 organic'
stat巴， its individuals are nonetheless made up of 
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di仟ering levels of 、being'﹒ Within each individual lies 
particularistic personal memori巴s coupled with distinct 
waγs of in.terpreting their lives. These memories thrive 
despite the control over the outer aspects .of their lives 
by th巴 state. While the state during the New Order saw 
itself as the caretaker, it made no concession for 
individual creativity. This also points out a flaw in 
Arendt's conception of the social. She assumes that 
individual human beings are only objects to be acted 
upon by larger forces. 
However, 1 believe that the investigation of 
personal narratives willγield a greater, deeper and 
richer understanding of the life of id 巴as which affect 
countries like Indonesia. In fact 1 believe that this 
paper has 悶悶ed ev巴n more questions for mys巴If. How 
complicit wer巴 the ideological archit巴cts of th巴 New
Ord巴 r regime and 巴ven other intellectuals in the many 
atrocities, which occurr巴d in Indon巴sia? How wer巴
many individual Indon巴sians able to cn巴at自己 counter-
narr司訂V巴 to th巴 state's 、social r巴alm巾 1 will att巴mpt to 
answer these questions in the second pa比 of my' paper. 
RUPTURES AND BREAKAGES 
What happ巴ns then when ruptur巴s begin to appear in 
the construction of the national narrative? According to 
Indonesian scholar Ariel Heryanto, the Indonesian 
imaginary is based on a 、simulacr白， or a form of 、 hyper
reality' (Heryanto 2006). Simply p此， the idea of 
Indonesia is built on a foundation of unreal images and 
myths perpetuated by the New Ord巴r reg ime since 
coming into being through the events of the abortive 
Octob巴r 1965 coup against its first pr巴sident Sukarno. 
The 巴V巴nts of that period had been so mγthologised 
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and officially narrativised through education , 
propaganda and ideology that anything b巴yond this 
rubric simply did not exist. Through the deaths, 
disappearances and incarceration without trial of 
5日0 ， 000 to nearly 1,000,000 souls, the New Order 
re日 ime led by former general Suha比0， created 
convenient enemies and bogeymen in which to achiev巴
two things: it sowed fear and through it, a unitγwhich 
bound Indonesians within this hyper-reality for more 
than thirty years. lt was only with the deleterious 
effects of the 1999 Asian Financial Crisis that 
Indonesia's 、veil of ignorance' was r巴moved. Howe'1且'r'j.，
there is still a ne巴d to und巴rstand how the New 0吋e1'
regime maintained its grip over the Indori研s.i當Íí"
populace for such a long period of tim巴. 叫自""
制州λ，.倡“
On 3日th S巴ptemb巴 r 1965, a cabal of gene.r;聶 S
were kidnapp巴d ， to內ured and killed in what app草草ireiih
to be an a吐empted coup. Later, in a government 、知愉d
paper' penned by historian Nugroho Notosusanto; ..the 
coup proved unsuccessful as 日 overnment forces I時已枷
the then G巴neral Suha代口 、saved' the 叮由tion
(Notosusanto & Ismail Saleh 1968). What exactIW""di'd' 
Suharto save Indonesia from? The state narratilie, as 
espoused by pro-government intellectuals such as 
Notosusanto, stated that military officers had colluded 
with the Communist Pa內Y of Indonesia to ov巴仕hrow
Sukarno, allowing the third largest Communist pa內y in 
the world at the time to reign. The murdered generals 
had stood in the way of the pro-communist 
conspirators and thus b巴came martyrs for th巴
Indon巴sian nation. In an act of vengeance, the military 
authorised large-scale 、c1 eansing' operations to 
e仟巴ctively destroy pro-communist or I 巴仕-wing
organisations in Indonesia. 丁he result was what one 
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obse向前 stat巴5 to be the largest instance of human 
rights violations in Southeast Asia (Roosa 2006). 
During the height of the communist witch hunt which 
occurred mainly in the islands of Java, Bali and 
Sumatra, scores of men and women 、disappeared'
either to be executed or to be placed en masse in the 
concentration camps. If .and when releas巴d ， thes巴
political prison巴rs or tahanan politik would continu巴 to
be stigmatis巴d and 、 ob閃閃出， by the state apparatus. 
The events of 1965 pi吐ed communities against each 
other, as the military stood aside in an 、advisory' role, 
leaving most of the 、 butch巴rin日， mainly in the hands of 
ordinary Indonesians. In the aft巴rmath of this 
cleansing , the state began creating 、 monsters' and 
'demons' in the minds of Indonesians constantly 
repeating the possibility of how these groups, if not 
prope叫y dealt with, will r巴turn to exact vengeanc巴 on
them. The New Order regim巴， as d巴scribed by James T. 
Siegel, was adept at moulding phantasms to maintain a 
constant stat巴 of fear and unce內ainty (Siegel 2006). 
For instanc皂， even several years after the ev巴nts of 
1965, conservative publication Te斤lp口 printed an article 
warning its r巴aders of the continuing existence of 
、formless' communists cells carrying out acts of 
sabotag巴 against Indonesia (Anon. 1972). It add巴d that 
ev巴n as many left-wing elements had been placed in 
、 quarantine'， these groups continued to pose a danger 
since th巴 detention camps th巴y were placed in were 
turned into 、schools'. The reminders of an omni月pr~sent
、 poltergeist'.seeking revenge ar巴 what hav巴 perhaps
kept the Indonesian nation together. 
Nonetheless, we must also acknowledge th巴
place of ideology and indoctrination in the process.τhe 
y巴且 rs following the rise of the N巴w Order, Suharto 
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Communist Pa比y. While not shown directly, th巴
audi巴nce was told that besides havin日的巴lr eyes 
gouged out, their 巴巴 nitalia we閃閃moved from their 
bodies as female communists danced atop their 
corps巴s. This pa內icular episode according to scholars 
serves as a cautionary tale that should Communism be 
allowed to flourish, women would run wild and 
therefore upsetting the harmonγand stability within 
Indonesian society (Wi巴ringa 2002). However, 
Indonesian media scholars studying the 、stru ctu re' of 
th巴se productions (amongst which includ巴 another one 
of Noer's production entitled Serangan Fajar or the 
'Attack at Dawn可 state that the themes seek to solidify 
id 巴as p巴比aining to gend巴r hierarchies as well as th巴
inseparable nature betw巴巴n the military and 
Indonesian society. Th巴se 、fictional' documentaries blur 
the line between reality and hyper-reality, as it moulds 
and creates .an organic relationship betwe巴n the 
individual and society. As such, the Indonesian state 
apparatus with its 、command cultur巴" is comparable to 
fascistic states such as Italy and Germany, where the 
individual merely exists as pa伐。f the greater whol巴"
Indonesians therefor巴 b巴came part and parcel of this 
greater organic entity known as the Indonesian state 
The reality of the state thus became the reality of the 
people. 
However, a rupture began to appear in the 
fabric of Indonesia's simulacra, threatening to t自己「
apa內 the image which had been so car巴fully crafted by 
the state. The heady y巴目的 of economic boom beli 巴d
de巴P巴r problems within the Indonesian economγ. The 
emphasis on development and pro日 ress led to 
accusations of corruption ‘ When the Indonesian 
currency, the rupiah and its economγcollapsed ， 
2日
inflation and panic soon spr巴ad. Th巴 New Ord巴 r reglm巴
began [osing its grip in the [ate 1990's [eading to 
massive vio[enc巴 vent巴d towards the then President 
Suharto and a[so Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority. 
However, that tumu[tuous period eventua[[γsaw the 
end of Suha內口's 3日-over year reign [eading to what 
many observers saw as the dawn of a new democratic 
age in Indonesia. The [ong-suffering Indonesian 
province of East Timor was f1 n 日 [[y granted 
independence in a 1999 referendum and the repub[ic 
began experimenting with autonomy for many of its 
other restive provinces. .9)l'n~ 代
IXGGMPM 
However, the sudden exp[osion of viQ 臣們它B
surprised and shocked manγIndon巴sian obse川'，ê:估r
Many scho[ars then went on to bring a new fO iJws，州tø
Indonesian studies, emphasising instead Of1".., a 
'ba[kanising' Indones日 rather than on the 、 o (g'â;;1B' 
nature of th巴 state (Erb , Su[istiγanto & Fauch巴r 110β，5~l. 
Indon巴sia it seems, has evo[ved from a sing[e 戶叫fied
entity into a fractious and disassemb[ed Frank仰的ElW
monster. Indonesianists h'ave bElgun [ooki~百 at
Indo悶5日 through the [Elns巴s of 、f扣u叩ndam巴n川ta副[is泣t伊陶g剖叫宙m
O叮r ethnic p 口叫[i怕t甘IC臼s. In a sense, the greater dem 白'cratic 
spac巴 brought about by Suhart口's departure cr巴ated an 
entire[y new arena of po[itics. This 、space' a[[owed as 
we[[ 'narratives from the past' to arise which wou[d 
otherwise b巴 considered taboo and unspeakab[e. In 
1998, wh巴n Suharto stepped down, state-produced 
documentaries g[orifying the armed forces and 
demonising the communists were no [onger shown in 
cinemas and te[evision stations. It was during this 
period of the Indonesian 、 spring'， that a different 
approach was used by both scho[ars and civil soci 巴ty
activists. 
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In dissecting the New Order façade, many 
scho[ars began investigating 、 memories' to unders個鬥d
this new phase of Indonesia's evo[ution. In a sense, the 
nation's new found b巴 lief in democracγa[[owed many 
to re-[ook what was previous[y thought as bein日 its
authentic nationa[ memories. 2 But to say that the new 
spirit of democracy paved the way for an outpouring of 
these previous[y undiscovered and hidden narratives is 
not 巴ntire[y accurate 
Ev巴n durin日 the ear[y days of the New Order 
regime, artists and authors have re[ied on the written 
word and imag巴s contesting th巴 state's narrative in 
Indonesia's pub[ic 、semi-sphere七 A testament to this is 
'Silenced Voices: New Writings from Indones日rrB
vo[ume pub[ished in 2000 as vo[um巴 12 issue 1 of 
Unive悶itγof Hawaii's journal Manoa comprising of 
stories contesting the New Order's interpretation of the 
Indonesian condition. Entitled 、Silenced Voices'，口nany
of the pieces contained therein exposed th皂、hidden
worlds' of those victimised and si[enced by the New 
Order regim 巴. For instance Ahmad Tohari's Ronggeng 
Dukuh paruk which means th巴 Dancer 口f Paruk Vi/lage 
or the Dancer for sho內， tells of a village caught on the 
wrong side of the New OrderfCommunist divide (Tohari 
2日00). Tohari's Dukuh paruk however is only a 
miniscu[e sub-story located within the grandernational 
schema. Srintil" a traditional ronggeng performer is 
chosen by h巴 r vi[[age to become th巴 next ronggeng 
2 One such e何。同 is an edited voJume bγMa門 S. Zurbuchen (2005) 
en廿tled Beginning to Remember: The Past in 的e Indonesian Presenι 
The artic!es included pieces written by scholars as well as a more 
personal piece written by a former poJitical prisoner. In particular, 
please see Ki Tristuti Rachmadi's '\阿y Life as a Shadow Puppet 阿 aster
under Suharto", pages 38-46 
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dancer in a traditi .on spanning generati .ons. Her l .o v巴「
Rasus, disapproves and later j .oins th巴且rmγEmpl .oying
a f .o rmulaic l.ove st.ory at the sUrface, the novel 
pr.ovides a micr.osc.opic view int.o the life of the majority 
.of Ind .onesìans as they are torn apa內 by ide.o logy and a 
nati.on intent .on dev.ouring its巴 If. 1n th巴巴nd ， th巴 village
is designat巴d a 、「巴d village' given their sympathies f.or 
the C.ommunist Party, and is all but wiped .out. Srintil is 
sacrificed as the 、 her.o' .of the st.o ry. Rasus r巴flects on 
his role in th巴 destruction of b.oth Dukuh Paruk and 
Srinti l. C.ontained within this particular volum巴 ar巴 als.o
writings by other authors relating their direct 
experienc巴5 under incarceration and torture by the Nβ叫做心
Order regime. 啥叫，咐f
，:，r.'，甜的'"
F.or instance, Hersri Setiawan (2000) speaks '"bf"'.'/ 
his time in a concentrati .on camp whilst Ayu Uta.mL酬划
(2日 00) writes .of her exp巴 ri巴nces .of exile as a humaQ,.", 
rights activist given th巴 antipathγthe 1ndonesian stáfe 月 1
has towards the civil society. Utami's writing is but p.aJit.叫
of a greater body lit巴rature which is now referred to 也斗
、exil巴 literature' comprising of works by auth .o rs for佈d叫
to se巴k refuge outsid巴 of 1nd .o n巴sia for fear of repri再由 Is
from th巴 state. Whil巴、exile literatur巴， is n.ot consider-ed'''',''''' 
、 mainstream' 1ndonesian literatur巴， the count仿古
cl .osest cont巴nder for a N.obel Prize, Pram.oedya Ananta 
Toer (1999) , has n.onetheless pr.ovided readers a long 
d巴巴p lo.ok int.o its s.oul through this genr巴.
Literatur巴 in 1ndonesia, as such, has provided 
that needed sphere and spac巴 which manγassumed 
have been engulfed by the power of the stat巴.
Nonetheless, within the c.onfines .of such oppr巴SS lO n ，
and ev巴n during the height .of the New Order's might, 
small p.ockets .of activists and writers continu巴d to defy 
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the state. Hannah Arendt, in her magnum .o pus The 
Human G口nditi.on explained that m.odernity and th巴 ns巴
.of what she referred t .o as the 、 s .o cial' had inadvertently 
cl .osed the space between 、private' and 、 public' realms 
(Arendt 1958). Using these c.oncepts to think ab .out a 口d
t .o analyse 1nd .onesia is v巴ry apt given the attempts by 
the stat巴 t.o absorb individuals and wh .o le s.ocieties int.o 
an .o rganic wh .o le. The 1ndonesian id 巴.o logy .of pancasila 
and the c.onstant use of media t .o enf.o rce a single 
unified imag巴ry has creat巴d the notion that reality 
app巴且也 to emanate only fr.om on巴 distinct point which 
is the states' stand p.o int. Arendt's 、 social' r皂白 1 r吶 。「
what Ar巴ndtian scholar Hanna Fenichel Pitkin calls the 
'blob' has blurred th巴 borders of individual freedom and 
action into the arena of the state. According to Arendt 
(1958) , th巴 public realm, which traditi .o nallγallowed for 
free men and women to discuss, d巴bate and to put 
politics into 、 praxis' has inst巴ad been usurped bγ 
modernity and in the case of the 1nd .o ne刮目， th巴 Stat巴
While Arendt does not mention specifically th巴 State，
sh巴悶兒rs to certain bureaucratic apparatuses which 
have inst巴ad taken over aspects .of 1 ife onc巴 set aside 
f.o r the individual within a private familγsetting. The 
New Order gov巴rnment， in its role as the 
d巴velopmentalist state, bec.omes the family itself, dis-
engaging the individual fr.om the public realm. The 
state in essenc巴 becomes the family, the father and the 
provider, leaving little space for individual eff.ort and of 
course fre巴dom. Non巴theless ， as Pitchkin admits, 
Arendt's use and design of the 、 social' c.oncept is 
problematic. Almost as if Iike some kind of unstoppable 
bl .ob, Arendt assum巴5 that 巴verything within its path 
w川 be consumed ultimately. 1t is depicted by Arendt as 
a "...Iiving autonomous ag巴nt determined to dominat巴
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human beings, absorb th 巴m ， and r巴nder them helpless" 
(Pitkin 1998: 3). 
Pitkin further stat巴s that it is both surprising and 
ultimately puzzling to have a political thinker exhorting 
humanity to activelγ seek fr巴巴dom and meaning to 
surrender herself to a concept which in itself is so 
inflexible, concrete and all consuming. However, by 
dividing the human condition into three aspects and in 
light of the post-1965 Indonesian condition, Arendt 
provid巴s a useful theoretical framework. The New 
Order regime app巴ars very much the 、 blob' but川fg川γh
power to 、 absorb and assimilate' is not total. Beneàth仙f
the state enforced state of amnesia, ordifÍ'司呼叫
Indonesians continue to inhabit an inner realm beγ口的自:~~，，\，7
which th巴 state cannot penetrate. An entire genrep的。私叫
literature which speaks dir巴ctly against th 巴 state is 01}為h
such example of this realm , and if w巴 were to Ió'õ'i('""\ 
mor巴 closely，的is is the realm of memories. Schol'a阻叫
hav巴 often written about the 、 dual' nature of bpt崢
Javanese and Balinese worlds where people ，:~仰自r叫
alongside a 、spirit' world. In an articl(! written r1Jy 
psychologist Robert Lemelson, a Balinese farm巴「 CIEJTTTS 州
to be surrounded by dark shadows and spil"its 
(Lemelson & Sur可rani 200已開 389-413). He also states 
that thes巴 dark figures attempt to enter his body, 
possessing him and thus turning him into a communist. 
It is later explained that the farmer was a witness to 
the killing of suspected communists , during the period 
of 1966. On the island alone, it is suspect巴d that 
between 70,000 to 80,000 peopl巴 were killed. In the 
earlier pa代 of this paper, I stated that the state sought 
to use indigenous understandings of pow巴 r and 
hierarchy in order to exert control over what was still a 
relativelγrural popula口。n.
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Howev巴 r， within these indigenous beliefs, lie an 
intensely 、 private r巴alm' wher巴 m巴mori巴s of massacres 
and killings continu巴 to occupy a space, like phantasms 
「巴fusing to be exorcised. According to scholar Leslie 
Dwyer, these atrocities continu巴 to b巴 unspeakable， but 
this does not mean their memories are erased (Dwyer 
20日9). Instead victims and even witnesses develop 
signs of psychosis, s巴巴ing spirits and ghosts but at the 
same time muted by the years of New Order rule. 
In a recent edition of Temp口， its repo仕age was 
spread throughout the length of Java, Bali and Sumatra 
seeking out witn巴sses， victims and perpetrators of th巴
killings during the fateful year of 1965 (Anon. 2012). 
Ironically Tempo , in its previous incarnation as a New 
Order sanctioned publication , was also r巴sponsible for 
publishing articles cond巴mning and vilifying the 
communists. Nonethel巴55 ， given th巴 lib巴 ral pr巴ss
environment in present daγIndon巴sia ， an enti r巴巴dition
dedicated to the year 1965 is an indication that 
Indone5ian5 are finally being to reveal more of this 
、 private~ realm suppressed for so manγyears. Many of 
those interviewed, both victims and perpetrators, 
reveal巴d intimate details of evil committed both by and 
on them. Amongst those inte凹iewed ， one p巴rpetrator
stated that had he not taken up the task of killing, he 
would have found hims巴If at th巴巴nd of a weapo口
instead. 3 Differing from the state narrative wh巴re the 
military takes centre-5tage, thes巴 narratives from 
below speak of the fear and uncertainty brought about 
by the political climate. According to the stories 
3 The ti甘e of this a前已峙( "Saya Sering Membawa Kampak Panjang. 
Daripada dibunuh, Lebih Baik Saya Membunuh" CQu)d be' roug-hly 
translated to literally mean "I 副ways car門 a long machete. Rather 
than beíng ki!led , 1 would rather kill" 
立已
一一
collected from what th巴 Tempo writ巴rs ref巴r to 己5
ladang pembantaian or the killing fields, many figures 
within the traditional village culture of Java, saw the 
communist as godless usurpers of the cosmic order 
Du巴 to this, many of thos巴 in the other pa內ies ，
especially those c\osely .Iinked with Islamist 
organisations went on to 、 neutralis巴，呂洞atural' threat 
to th巴 Indonesian nation. Whil巴 the armed forces wer巴
primarily responsible for the capture and incarc巴 ration
of dissidents, communist pa比γm巴mbers and left-wing 
elements, th巴的lIings were le代 in th巴 hands of ordin日 ry
Indonesians. In that given instance, ordinary 
Indonesians became as complicit in the killings a f)d州州丸
torture as th 巴 state itself. The line between Indonesiah叫r
society and the state blurred, making it impossible theQ. i甜、l
to pinpoint i吋ividual wrongdo巴rs ~as c~lpability ha~' ，i'ii"~/ 
become univ巴rs日 1.' 叭州叫叫
."~淵且也Following th巴 revelation made by IndonesiaÍl .~\ 
Human Rights Commission (Komnasham) in 2012 t[)'a租 m叫
the state was the main perpetrator in the seri巴5 iof\~ 
events in 1965, a v巴 il ， it seems, has been lifted. Wh.iU，6;，沁蝴
th 巴 Indonesian press has been activ巴Iy discussing ~/í巴
issues in the past few y巴ars ， Komnasham's repo內且a:W11世枷吼
the needed momehtum, making th巴戶口日roms of 1965'"a 
、visible' reality. Volumes of oral historical accounts 什om
th巴 victims hav巴 made their way into bookstores but 
their impact paled in comparison with the release of the 
report. Coincidentally, a documentary based on the 
巴xp巴ri巴nc巴5 of individuals active in the captur巴 and
4 In a news a內icle ， Coordinating Po1itical, Legal and Security Affairs 
Minister Djoko Suyant。啊 ..indicated that the mass 阿\1ings during the 
communist pur日 e were justified as they were 8imed at protecting the 
country." As such, Djoko claims there is no need for the state to 
apo\ogise. For more information p\ease see Aritonang (2日 12).
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的Ilings of suspect巴d communists, and screened at a 
Canadianmmfestivalr fed the g 「owing cDntroversy.E 
Whil巴 the curr巴nt administration under Susilo Bambang 
yudhDYDnDis taklng p「D-actiVEStepsin facing up tothE 
pastrmanyg 「DUPE remainsteBdfastin believlng that 
any attempt at national reconciliation is tantamount to 
admisslonof guilt FD「 instancer leademwlthin thE 
Islamist organisatlonlvadhlatuI LJlama has statEd that lt 
would be b巴吐er to 、、 ...forgive and for自巴t what ha戶戶ened
ln the past End mDVEDn'， (A「itonang20121.Thus-EVEn
with the increas巴d openness in the disc已slonhf the 
pogroms, pa代s of the lndonesian society would rather 
ltsllp away intoobliVion unllkE in GE「many vvhe「e the 
Holocaust sits visibly on the collectiv巴 consci巴nce of its 
peopl巴F the events of 1965and of Other instancEsof 
human Fights violatlon thmughout thea「chipelago
continues to occupy only a small pa內 of the Indon巴slan
psyche. Why is this so? Th巴 answ巴 r becor口巴s cl巴己「
when we take into consid巴ration how the state ideology 
「emalnsas an anchD「 in IndoneslB's continued dallianc巴
with d巴mocracy. As Indonesia b巴comes an increasingly 
lmp口比ant-playe「 ln theglobal economy, it wlllCDntlnuE 
to capitalise on the pancasila to n門 aintain societal 
cohesion in the face of globalisation. 6 Howev巴 r ， not 
being abfe to 、 normalise' its past also pres巴ntsarclEa 「
and p悶Entfange「 in thatr lf the IESSOnsof thEpast 
are ignored, history is doomed to repeat itself 
f Fo r m o re i n fo r m a t i o n , p l e a s e s e e o p p e n h e l m 的 "The Act of圳K附H川枷11刊l口inq"
(20倪12叫勾) and w州.t吋he臼actof做削削馴k划圳圳il川川lIin呵且 C∞om f叮 扣如furt內巾h怕er details on the 
screening of the film. 
67he panc叫a 問fers to Indon闊的 five 叫onaJ 由圳a! virtues of 
1)Belief m 。ne God;2)Just and clV:lised humanity; 們 The unitv of 
Indonesia; 的 Guided democ用叮r andF5)5。dal Judci.whlle 斗se
VI代ues were imp。此antr they were nonetheless the culminatlon of a |arger Ideological process which began asearlγas Indonesia's 
independence after Wor!d War 2 
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Malaysia (UKM) to unde比ake academic research on subjects 
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institute. is 、onlγone of its kind' in Malaysia, focusing 
specificallγon 、 ethnic studies' with thematic studies 
orientation. The Institute emerged out of the need to 
maintain at home the present peaceful inter- and intra-ethnic 
existence against worldwide problematic, and sometimes 
violent ethnic situations. 
OrganisationallY' K打A has five research c1 usters, each bE?~!@~圳、
led by a prominent scholar or a highly experien"'M.".... 
professional person. The five research clusters are: So.cia).~'~"~r，.， 
Th叩門 and Ethnic Studies; Ethnicity and Reli日ion; Ethni卸的(...，...;..7'
at Wo'rkplace; Ethnicity and Consumerism, and The A內s ana-
50cial Integration. KlTA's postgraduate program (PhD :3附甘叫划
Masters) was launched in December 2009 回 泊是向t
,1-" '.'~， 
MengenaiKZTA j酬。
Institut Kajian Etnik (K打的 ditubuhkan secara rasmi 0'1吋
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia pada 8 Dktober 2口的，也叫合z
merupakan satu-satunya institut penyelidikan di Mal哥問 i2i­
γang memberi tur叩uan sepenuhnγa kepada segala k~jiê，恥、
berkaitan dengan 、etnik' dan 、etnisiti' ， L .. 
Dari segi organisasi, KITA mempunγai lima rumpun 
penγelidikan. 5etiap satu rumpun diketuai oleh seorang 
sa叮ana atau ahli profesionalγang mempunyai rekod prestasi 
ce阿1e叫 ang. Li付1a rumpun penyelidikan berkenaan adalah 
Teori 50sial dan Kajian Etnik; Etnisiti dan Agama; Etnisiti di 
Tempat Kerja; Etnisiti dan Konsumerisme; dan Kesenian dan 
Integrasi 5osial. Mulai Disember 2009, KlTA menawarkan 
program siswazah (PhD dan 5a可ana).
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